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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
I. SPONTANEOUS EXCLAMATIONS 1
Spontaneous 2 utterances, exclamations or declarations are, under
certain conditions, admissible in evidence though the party who made
them does not take the stand. According to most courts the occasion
must be startling enough to cause shock, which in turn creates an emo-
tional state. The utterance must be made under stress of that emo-
tion; it must be "spontaneous and natural; impulsive and instinctive" ;3
it should be immediate, or "so clearly connected (with the occasion)
that the declaration may be said to be the spontaneous explanation of
the real cause. '" 4 Although in some jurisdictions there is insistence that
the declaration be "contemporaneous" with the act, or "while the act
is going on," 5 the progressive view seems to be that the time interval,
beyond which a declaration would no longer be spontaneous, is in the
sound discretion of the trial court.6 Thus, in one case,7 after a wreck the
conductor came up to the engine, went back to the caboose, and then
walked a mile to a telephone, where he consumed twenty-five minutes
in calling headquarters. On his return to the train, while moving the
injured to the caboose, he remarked that a defective rail had caused
'This series of articles is the joint work of Mortimer J. Adler and Jerome
Michael of Columbia University, and Robert M. Hutchins and Donald Slesinger
of Yale University. The first paper in the series was prepared by the Yale
authors with the approval of the Columbia authors. The Yale authors ac-
knowledge their indebtedness to the Sterling Fellowship Fund, through the
assistance of which their part of the work has been carried on, and to A. J.
Russell, an honors student in Evidence at Yale.
Throughout this article the word "spontaneous" is used as the courts use
it, rather than in a strictly scientific sense. Since Pasteur's experiments on"spontaneous generation" the word has lost caste scientifically. What the courts
mean is obvious from the context. Instead of an act of pure free will, stimu-
lated by nothing, created out of the air, so to speak, the courts mean an act so
dominated by considerations external to the self, that rational thought or per-
sonal will plays no part. The authors have that meaning in mind.
'2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1749. For the present no attempt
will be made at criticism from the standpoint of terminology. As long as the
meaning is clear, there seems to be no point in substituting one technical vocab-
ulary for another, especially in the absence of an unequivocal dictionary of
psychology.
" Leahy v. R. R., 97 Mo. 165, 10 S. W. 58 (1888), reported in WIGMORE, supra
note 3.
'See note 19 L. R. A. 733 (1893); Reg. v. Bedingfield, 14 Cox Crim. Cas.
341 (1879); People v. Wong Ark, 96 Calif. 125 (1892); Holmes v. Wharton,
140 S. E. 93 (N. C. 1927).
'See (1921) 70 U. PA. L. REv. 332; (1926) 25 MIcH. L. REv. 277; Krooner
v. City of Waterbury, 136 AtI. 93 (Conn. 1927); Kressen v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry., 215 N. W. 908 (Wis. 1927).
'Walters v. Spokane Int. Ry., 58 Wash. 293, 108 Pac. 593 (1910), annotated
in 42 L. R. A. (N.s.) 917.
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the disaster, and his statement was admitted in evidence as a spontane-
ous declaration. In other cases declarations made from a few seconds
to fifteen minutes after the occurrence have been termed "mere narra-
tion of past events," and therefore excluded.8
Apparently the type of utterance toward which the courts are most
favorably inclined is that which follows a severe shock to the declar-
ant." A startling invasion of the declarant's repose is assumed to lead
to a trustworthy statement, whether the declarant be a congenital liar,
an infant, a murderer, or a minister of the gospel.'0 Whereas an iden-
tical blow on the head might conceivably produce different emotions in
a boxer and a bookkeeper, it is likely that statements made by each
would, by many courts, be admitted in evidence as spontaneous exclama-
tions.
Since the shock is what guarantees the truth of these declarations,
some courts rule that it alone must produce them. Although dying in
agony, if, in response to an inquiry as to the identity of his assailant, the
declarant says that the defendant shot him, the statement must be ex-
cluded." As a result of the interpolation of the question, what would
otherwise be admissible becomes "not the natural and spontaneous out-
growth of the murderous assault on him, but a mere narrative of a past
transaction, and hence not a part of the res gestae."1
2
Where no questions have been asked, the courts are willing to con-
cede that physical shock to the declarant is likely to produce the truth
8 See (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 524; Parker v. State, 136 Ind. 284, 35 N. E. 1105
(1896) (immediately); Green v. State, 113 So. 121 (Fla. 1927), (immediately
after) ; Eastman v. B. & M. Ry., 165 Mass. 342, 43 N. E. 115 (1896), (exclusion
of statement made ten minutes after affirmed as not res gestae) ; Guild v. Prin-
gle, 130 Fed. 419 (C. C. A. 4th, 1904). Cf. (1915) 64 U. PA. L. REv. 99, 851.
'The usual case is one of physical shock. Some cases where there is no
physical damage discuss the statements as though they were spontaneous decla-
rations, but they appear to be circumstantial evidence of state of mind, and not
hearsay at all. Such cases are Western Union Tel. Co. v. Davis, 24 Tex. Civ.App. 427, 59 5. W. 46 (1900); in action for injured feelngs: Oh, that I could
have seen him before he died !" and Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. McDavid,
157 S. W. 224 (Tex. 1913)-to show mental anguish in libel, plaintiff's wife's
statements: "How could they say that about her! . . . I will be afraid to look
my friends in the face" admissible.
" This tendency of the law of evidence to disregard individual differences
will be treated more fully in a later article. It will suffice to call attention to
it here. Cf. the annotations in 65 L. R. A. 316 and L. R. A. 1915 E 202.
"Greener v. Gen. Electric Co., 209 N. Y. 135, 102 N. E. 527 (1913) ; Rogers
v. State, 88 Ark. 451, 115 S. W. 156 (1908). Contra, State v. Mack, 138 S. E.
153 (Ga. 1927) ; Lucchesi v. Reynolds, 125 Wash. 352, 216 Pac. 12 (1923).
" People v. Westcott, 260 Pac. 901 (Cal. App. 1927). Cf. Whipple, Psyckol-
ogy of Observation and Report, (1918) 15 PsYcH. BULL. 217 et seq. remarks that
"Items recalled by interrogation . . .may often be reported as accurately as
other items." GORPHE, La Critique du Temoignage (1927) and MiNSTE B ERG,
ON THE WrrNESS STANiD (1908) find stories without question more accurate
than those with. Clearly the type of question is important. The question
"who did it?" would probably not cause an inaccurate, suggested reply, while
phrasing it "Did John do it?" might.
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if the utterance comes before time to misrepresent has been afforded
him. They are willing to go a step further and concede that a speaker
who has received no injury, but who is involved in the startling oc-
currence will, if sufficiently excited, be honest, too. A motorman, a
brakeman, or an engineer,13 although he escapes unscathed from the
wreckage of his train, will not lie about the cause of the catastrophe un-
til he has regained his equilibrium. But the casual bystander14 who has
no interest in later suits against the railroad, but who is much affected
by the sad spectacle, is by no means so reliable."; Some courts ex-
clude what he has said because he is disinterested. He is not an
actor, however much he was moved by the action. The fact that his
statement appears to be made without premeditation or design cannot
save it. The reason given for admitting an actor's statement is suffi-
cient to exclude his. As the Kentucky court has put it, the admission
of the utterances of excited bystanders would open the door to "reck-
less, thoughtless and ill-considered exclamations,"'16 which are pre-
cisely the kind, and the only kind that are admitted under the rule as to
spontaneous declarations made by injured persons or actors.
17
Even though most courts do admit the statements of excited by-
standers, where there is a stimulus which is not sufficient to produce ex-
citement, they do not ordinarily attribute to it the truth-evoking quali-
ties ascribed to shock. This is so even though there is no conceivable
motive to misrepresent, and the person who heard the exclamation is
Chawkley v. Wabash Ry., 297 S. W. 20 (Mo. 1927) (fireman); Swanson
v. Pacific Shipping Co., 60 Wash. 87, 110 Pac. 795 (1910) (ship captain); L. &
N. Ry. v. Molly's Admx., 122 Ky. 219, 91 S. W. 685 (1906) (buggy driver);
but cf. L. & C. Parket Co. v. Samuel, 22 Ky. L. R. 979, 59 S. W. 3 (1900) (deck
hand).
I' See the discussion of this attitude from the psychological standpoint,
snfra.
i As to the exclamations of excited bystanders, see (1921) 35 H11v. L. Rxv.
209; (1923) 22 MIcH. L. REv. 843; (1926) 25 MIcH. L. Rxv. 466; and the annota-
tions 20 L. R. A. (N. s.) 133 (1909) and 33 L. R. A. (N. s.) 109 (1910). In At-
lantic Coast Line v. Crosby, 53 Fla. 400, 43 So. 318 (1907); Ganaway v. Salt
Lake Drama Assn., 17 Utah, 37, 53 Pac. 830 (1898) ; Dean v. State, 105 Ala. 21,
17 So. 28 (1895) ; Hall v. Comm., 289 S. W. 1102 (Ky. 1927), such evidence was
held inadmissible. In DuBois v. Luthmer, 147 Ia. 315, 126 N. W. 147 (1910);
Hedlund v. Minneapolis St.' Ry., 120 Minn. 319, 139 N. W. 603; Cromeenes v.
San P. L. A. & S. L. Ry., 37 Utah, 475, 109 Pac. 10 (1910); Johnson v. St. P. &
W. Coal Co., 126 Wis. 492, 105 N. W. 1048 (1906), it was admitted."Louisville Ry. v. Johnson, 131 Ky. 277, 115 S. W. 207 (1909).
"'A delicate situation has arisen several times where, under the influence of
a strong emotion, contradictory statements were made. Some judges who have
had to consider the subject seem to take the view that though the declarant was
still emotionally upset when he made the second statement, the time elapsed
alters its credibility. There is no sound psychological reason for this judicial
choice. Cf. Vaughn v. St. L. & S. F. Ry., 177 Mo. App. 155, 164 S. W. 144
(1914); Westcott v. Waterloo C. F. & N. Ry., 173 Iowa, 355, 155 N. W. 255
(1915); Stukas v. Warfield, Pratt, Howell Co., 188 Iowa 878, 175 N. W. 81
(1919) ; Flanagan v. Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 22 F.(2d) 136 (1927).
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on the stand, subject to cross-examination as to all the circumstances
of its making. Thus, if just before an automobile runs down a pedes-
trian, a witness watching it from a trolley car remarks on its high
speed, the statement is inadmissible.' 8 If, where the plaintiff's con-
tention is that death was caused by the unnecessary blowing of a
whistle which resulted in the frightening of the deceased's horse, he
offers a woman's statement, made a block and a half away, that "it was
brutish the way they whistled," the evidence cannot come in b~cause
-the declarant was sitting calmly in her home.' The declarant's report
that, at the time of the shot, which he heard three-quarters of a mile
off, he said someone was trying his pistol, is not admitted as a spon-
taneous exclamation.
20
The general theory under which these declarations are admissible
has been well stated by Mr. Wigmore.2 1 "Under certain external cir-
cumstances of physical shock a state of nervous excitement may be pro-
duced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so
that the utterance which occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to
the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external
shock." And "since this utterance is made under the immediate and
controlled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when
considerations of self-interest could not have been fully brought to
bear by reasoned reflection, the utterances may be taken to! be par-
ticularly trustworthy."
This reflective self-interest is a curious doctrine, dating back to a
mentalist psychology, and the utilitarian philosophy that made use of it.
Man's conduct, according to this theory of behavior, was always per-
sonally motivated, his acts being planned by an elaborate calculus of in-
terests, immediate and remote. Since that calculus involved reflection,
it clearly followed that by eliminating reflection, self-interested conduct
became impossible. The entrance of instinct into psychology shifted
the emphasis, without changing the fundamental idea, by putting self-
interest on an instinctive basis. The modern tendency is to substitute
groups of habits or habit patterns for such general concepts as self-
interest. These, if they serve the self, may afterward be called self-
interested. That they are not, in fact, due to a force or instinct of
self-interest, is shown by their persistence beyond the point of general
Gouin v. Ryder, 38 R. I. 31, 94 Adt. 670 (1915). The declarant was on the
stand.
"Chicago & E. Ry. v. Cummings, 24 Ind. App. 192, 53 N. E. 1026. (1899) The
declarant was on the stand.
Baker v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. App. 392, 77 S. W. 618 (1903). The declar-
ant was on the stand. Cf. Emens v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 223 Fed. 810 (D. N.
Dak. 1915); Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Collier, 62 Tex. 318 (1884).
' 3 WIGo10RE, op. cit. mipra note 3, 738.
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efficiency. The habit of saving money, for example, is, in certain cir-
cumstances, self-interested. But a person having the habit will tend to
continue to save even when it is directly against his interest. Reflection
plays a part, both in the formation of habits, and in resolving conflicts
between them. But once formed, they continue, on their own inertia,
creating the illusion of a definite force.
To still, or circumvent this "force," the law relies in part on im-
mediacy. The veracity of a response, according to the courts, varies
directly with its speed. The desire to lie requires time and reflection,
to develop. And the intervention of reflection may be avoided by giv-
ing it no time to occur, thus rendering lying difficult, if not impossible.
In order to estimate the time required for reflection, it is necessary
to know something of the difficulty of the task reflection is to perform.
Ordinarily the choices are very simple ones, involving few alternatives.
"John did it !" or "John did not do it !" The gentleman of after-dinner
fame who, on being informed that his train had fallen over an embank-
ment while he slept, cried, "Oh, my shoulder" in all probability did not
take many moments to respond to the situation. If his general charac-
ter is pointed to by way of explanation, the answer is simply that it is
precisely that sort of character that the courts are guarding against.
A number of laboratory psychological experiments have been per-
formed which throw some light on the problem under consideration. A
subject is asked to disobey one of several orders, 22 concealing from the
examiner which order he has disobeyed. Or two subjects are sent out
of the room, one to perform a series of acts, the other to do nothing,
the actor trying to conceal his "crime." 23 To each subject, then, is read
a series of words, some of which are directly associated with the crimes
in question, with the request that he respond as quickly as possible with
the first word that comes to his mind, taking care, however, to avoid
giving away his crime.24 All observers report a delay in reaction time to
key words where deception is attempted, although Marston 26 discovered
a small group, which he called good liars, whose reaction time to sig-
nificant words was actually faster than to the rest of the list. It seems,
then, that the courts are on the right track in demanding speed as a
guarantee of truth, or, at least of the absence of attempted falsehood.
'Marston, Reaction Time Symptoms of Deception, (1920) 3 JouR. Exre.
PsYcH. 72-87.
'Langfeld, Psycho-physical Symptoms of Deception, (1920) 15 JoUR. ABN.
PsYcH. 319-28.
"4Similar experiments have been performed by Jung, The Association
Method, (1910) 21 Am. JOUR. PSYCH., 219-69; Yerkes & Berry, The Associa-
tion Reaction Method of Mental Diagnosis, (1909) 20 Am. JOUR. PSYCH., 22-27;
Whipple, Observer v. Reporter, (1906) 6 PsYcH. BuLL., 153-70, and others.
Z Supra, note 22.
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The difficulty comes when the speed is considered, not as a general idea,
but quantitatively. Here we find that the difference in time between the
ordinary reaction and the deception reaction to significant words is so
slight, from .83 seconds to 32 minutes, that it cannot be measured
without the aid of instruments. The sound discretion of the trial judge,
with the best of intention in these cases, is likely to be fallible.
But it will be remembered that speed is riot the only guarantee of
truthful response. In order more fully to guard against deceit, a good
deal of reliance is placed on shock, and the emotion generated thereby,
provided it is severe enough to still the reflective faculties. There is
every reason to suppose that such an emotion would render difficult a
consciously planned lie. As. Mr. Watson inelegantly puts it,26 emotion
is an affair of the guts, beyond control of the intellect, and pretty well
running it during its active phase. It halts digestion, speeds up heart
rate, increases blood pressure,27 creates general muscular tension
throughout the body, pours sugar and adrenin into the blood stream.
These bodily changes are certainly discomforting to intellectual activity.
They paralyze and distort it all along the line; unfortunately, while they
make thinking difficult, they render observation and judgment all but
impossible.
One need not be a psychologist to distrust an observation made
under emotional stress; everybody accepts such statements with men-
tal reservation. M. Gorphe28 cites the case of an excited witness to a
horrible accident who erroneously declared that the coachman deliber-
ately and vindictively ran down a helpless woman. Fiore29 tells of an
emotionally upset man who testified that hundreds were killed in an
accident; that he had seen their heads rolling from their bodies. In
reality only one man was killed, and five others injured. Another ex-
cited gentleman took a pipe for a pistol.3O Besides these stories from
real life, there -are psychological experiments which point to the same
conclusion. After a battle in a classroom, prearranged by the experi-
menter but a surprise to the students, each one was asked to write an
account of the incident.31 The testimony of the most upset students
was practically worthless, while those who were only slightly stimulated
emotionally scored better than those left cold by the incident. Miss
Hyde of Nebraska tells of an unpublished experiment, the results of
HARER's MAGAZINE, February, 1928, at 315.
CANNON, BODILY CHANGES IN FEAR, HUNGER AND RAGE, (1915).
3 Op. cit supra note 12.
' Fiore, II valaue psicologico delle testimoniange, 2e Cg. d. Soc. filas, ital.
Bologna-Modena. Formaguine, 1908, 26 p. Reported in GoPsHE, supra, note 12.
1 GROSS, Handbuch ffir Untersucheusrichter als System der Kriminalistic,
(1893).
'Kobler, Ei Recltpsychologisches Experinment, (1914) 8 ZScHE F. ANGEN.
PsYch., 317-25. Reported by Whipple, (1915) 12 PsYcH. BuLL. 221-24.
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which differed only in the general inaccuracy of all accounts, regardless
of the amount of emotion generated. 32  The conclusion drawn from
these, and other similar experiments,3 3 is that "emotion may virtually
hold connected perception in abeyance so that the subject has only
isolated sensations to remember instead of a logically connected unit
perception." 34
That participants, as well as bystanders,35 have their perceptions
clouded by strong emotions will not be doubted. When a carriage con-
taining the inevitable psychologist36 upset, that worthy gentleman
amused himself and his companions by taking depositions while they
awaited assistance. He had no known reality to check their stories
against, but it was obvious that if any one was right, all the rest were
wrong. That even trained observers are fallible is well brought out
in an editorial in the New York World in which several accounts of
newspaper reports of the striking of Kerensky on his recent visit to
America are printed. Though the reporters were all experts, and sit-
ting close to the platform, each one told a different story of what must
have been a fairly simple event.3 7
'The amount, or presence of any emotion at all presents another interest-
ing problem. Syz, Observations on the Unreliability of Subjective Reports of
Emotional Reactions. (1920) 17 BRIT. JOUR. Psycx. Gen. Sect. 119-26 reports the
following. His subjects were hooked up to a psycho-galvanometer capable of
recording the electrical change which takes place in one under emotional stress.
Then a list of words was given, and they were asked to report those words
which caused in them an emotional feeling. Their reports and the galvanometer
readings were not in accord. They reported emotion to conventional words like
mother, father, etc., whereas they registered emotion with entirely different ones.
M JNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND, (1908).
arston, Studies in Testimony, (1924) 15 JouR. CR. LAW AND CRIMIINOL-
oGY, 5-32.
' It will be remembered that some courts make a distinction between the two.
' Cholvec, Die Schwarmerische Lige. (1905) Beitr. z. Psych. der Auss. II
(2) 93-97 (reported in GORPHE, supra note 12).
' These are descriptions of the manner in which the young woman struck
her blow:
WORLD: "Slashed him viciously across the cheek with her gloves."
NEWS: "Struck him on the left cheek with the bouquet."
AiEImcAN: "Dropped her flowers and slapped him in the face with her
gloves.'
TIMES: "Slapped his face vigorously with her gloves three times."
HERALD TRIuNE: "Beat him on the face and head ... a half-dozen blows."
EVENING WORLD: Struck him across the face "several times."
MnoR: Struck him a single time.
PosT: "Vigorously and accurately slapped him."
And this is what happened next:
AMErCAN: Kerensky "reeled back."
EVENING WORLD : "He stood unmoved."
NEWs: "He stepped back, maintaining a calm pose."
WORLD: He stood still, but used his arms to "wave back his friends."
HERALD TRIBUNE: He stood still, with his arms "thrown back."
JOURNAL: "He reeled."
POST: "He remained unmoved."
MRioR: "He reeled from the blow. His supporters were stemmed by a
handful of royalists. Fists flew; noses ran red; shirts and collars were torn."
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The result of these observations is a dilemma. From the point of
view of subjective veracity, the speed the courts demand does not neces-
sarily guarantee truth. And from the standpoint of objective accuracy,
emotion is little better. If a speedy reaction means nothing without the
aid of a stopwatch, an emotional reaction means nothing without elimi-
nating the emotion. What the emotion gains by way of overcoming the
desire to lie, it loses by impairing the declarant's power of observation.
On the one hand, if reflective self-interest has not had a chance to oper-
ate because of emotional stress, then the statement should be excluded
because of the probable inaccuracy of observation. On the other, if
little emotion is involved, clearly a very short time is sufficient to allow
reflective self-interest to assume full sway. On that basis there would
seem to be no reason for this hearsay exception. In fact, the emphasis
should be all the other way. On psychological grounds, the rule might
very well read: Hearsay is inadmissible, especially (not except) if it
be a spontaneous exclamation.
Of course, such a result would be preposterous. The evidence is
relevant and should be admitted unless it is so worthless as to mislead
the tribunal or waste its time. It would do neither to a tribunal trained
to decide the weight to be given to evidence in the light thrown by a
knowledge of the background of the declarant, and the circumstances in
which an exclamation was made. To this tribunal statements now
viewed with suspicion because they are not made under emotional
stress, would seem to represent more accurate observation for that very
reason. Since an injured person is the one most affected by his injury,
his observations would be considered less reliable than those of an
uninjured motorman, brakeman, or engineer, and a fortiori less than
those of a casual, unexcited bystander. And, according to this view,
the best evidence of all is a statement made in immediate response to
an external stimulus which produces no shock or nervous excitement
whatever.
Professor Morgan's38 insistence on the admissibility of declara-
tions closely connected in time with such a stimulus seems entirely jus-
tified. With emotion absent, speed present, and the person who heard
the declaration on hand to be cross-examined, we appear to have an
ideal exception to the hearsay rule. Statements by passengers before
any damage has been done about the roughness of the train ride ;39
observations as to the speed of a train as it is going by;40 remarks
'A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae. (1922)
31 YALE L. J. 229.
' Marlatt v. Erie Ry. Co., 154 App. Div. 388, 139 N. Y. Supp. 771 (4th Dept.
,o Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Gesswine, 144 Fed. 5 (C. C. A. 6th, 1906).
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made on hearing a fight in progress some distance away ;41 "why don't
the train whistle ?", spoken as the declarant saw it approaching the cross-
ing ;- - 42 all these are exclamations the value of which is indicated by
the opportunity to cross-examine the hearer as to the surrdunding cir-
cumstances, by the speed 43 of the reaction, and the unemotional condition
of the speaker.
44
Thus it appears that the spontaneous declarations regarded with
least favor by the courts are more trustworthy than those which most
of them admit without question: those where the trial judge rules that
the statement was made under the influence of severe physical shock.
It 'is by no means suggested, however, that these last should be excluded
simply because other types of evidence assumed to be less reliable turn
out, on investigation, to be more reliable. It is suggested, on the con-
trary, that all these varieties of declarations be admitted. If relevant
they should go to the jury; for some are demonstrably more accu-
rate than we have hitherto supposed, and those now admitted are not
so inaccurate as to be arbitrarily excluded. To exclude any because they
are not the immediate outpourings of an injured person is to insist on






1Pope v State, 174 Ala 63, 57 So. 245 (1911).
Emens v. Lehigh Valley, supra note 20.
'As was pointed out above, speed is of relatively slight importance in the
absence of instruments. Some knowledge of the habits and temperament of
the declarant would be more relevant. Otherwise it is safe to assume that if
reflective self-interest had not put in an appearance before three and a half min-
utes, it was not likely to do so later on, without some outside interference.
" The possible objection being that hearsay is about twenty per cent less
accurate than the testimony of eye witnesses. 6 Whipple, (1909) PsYcH. BuLa.
153-70.
